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INPUT AND OUTPUT LEGITIMACY OF MULTI-STAKEHOLDER INITIATIVES 
 
ABSTRACT 
In a globalizing world, governments are not always able or willing to regulate the 
social and environmental externalities of global business activities. Multi-stakeholder 
initiatives (MSI), defined as global institutions involving mainly corporations and civil 
society organizations, are one type of regulatory mechanism that tries to fill this gap by 
issuing soft law regulation. This conceptual paper examines the conditions of a legitimate 
transfer of regulatory power from traditional democratic nation-state processes to private 
regulatory schemes, such as MSIs. Democratic legitimacy is typically concerned with input 
legitimacy (rule credibility, or the extent to which the regulations are perceived as justified) 
and output legitimacy (rule effectiveness, or the extent to which the rules effectively solve the 
issues). In this study, we identify MSI input legitimacy criteria (inclusion, procedural fairness, 
consensual orientation, and transparency) and those of MSI output legitimacy (rule coverage, 
efficacy, and enforcement), and discuss their implications for MSI democratic legitimacy. 
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While markets have expanded globally, the political regulation of business activities 
has not expanded at the same pace (Habermas, 1998; Hsieh, 2009; Kobrin, 2008). An 
increasing number of social and environmental issues – from sweatshop working conditions 
in factories to waste disposal and deforestation – occur along globally stretched processes of 
value production (Bartley, 2010). Many of those issues remain unregulated or underregulated 
(Kobrin, 2008). As transnational corporations (TNC) expand their activities, sourcing 
globally, the negative social and environmental externalities of these activities are 
increasingly criticized (Scherer & Palazzo, 2011; Waddock, 2008). As a consequence, some 
TNCs have started to engage in self-regulation, developing and implementing social and 
environmental standards into their operations. This engagement has been discussed as a 
political form of corporate social responsibility (CSR) (Kobrin, 2009; Matten & Crane, 2005; 
Scherer, Palazzo, & Baumann, 2006), because corporations step in, where governments are 
not willing or not able to play their regulatory role. Some of these activities take place at an 
individual corporate level; for instance, when Nike developed and imposed a code of conduct 
on its direct suppliers (Zadek, 2004). However, increasingly, these self-regulatory activities 
manifest in multi-stakeholder initiatives (MSI), defined as private governance mechanisms 
involving corporations, civil society organizations, and sometimes other actors, such as 
governments, academia or unions, to cope with social and environmental challenges across 
industries and on a global scale (Gilbert & Rasche, 2008; Utting, 2002). Indeed, there is an 
“emerging institutional infrastructure” of CSR that creates “new rules of the game” for TNCs 
(Waddock, 2008: 105). 
MSIs are attempts to fill global regulatory gaps, primarily by issuing ‘soft law’ 
standards (Utting, 2002), which are non-binding and voluntary private rules, generally not 
enforced through governmental mechanisms (Abbott & Snidal, 2000; Gilbert & Rasche, 
2008). MSIs represent a key element in the emerging global regulatory order that has been 
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characterized as private governance or governance with and without government (Rosenau & 
Czempiel, 1992). However, the rise of private governance, as opposed to the traditional 
understanding of governance by government, has raised numerous concerns (Cerny, 1999; de 
Senarclens & Kazancigil, 2007; Graz & Nölke, 2008; Kingsbury, 1999). Regulation through 
governmental bodies is ideally embedded in national democratic regimes, where those who 
make political decisions have been elected to do soi. Thus, the legitimacy of national hard 
law, public regulation edicted and enforced by the nation-state, relies on the regime of direct 
or representative democracy. Private regulatory schemes, such as MSIs, are not embedded in 
such a context of well-established democratic mechanisms. 
The democratic legitimacy of a regulatory body can be understood as the “socially 
shared belief” that the regulator has the capacity and the authority to impose rules on a 
community of citizens (Scharpf, 2009: 173). Democratic legitimacy is concerned with two 
main questions: to what extent regulations are perceived as justified or credible (input 
legitimacy) and to what extent they effectively solve the issues that they target (output 
legitimacy) (Risse, 2006; Scharpf, 1997, 1999). The input legitimacy of regulatory institutions 
concerns the evaluation of the design of political processes (i.e. how rules were developed) 
(Scharpf, 1997). It represents governance by the people (Scharpf, 1999). Input legitimacy 
builds on the idea that “political choices should be derived, directly or indirectly, from the 
authentic preferences of citizens and, that, for that reason, governments must be held 
accountable to the governed” (Scharpf, 1997: 19, emphasis in original). Output legitimacy, in 
turn, describes “the capacity to solve problems requiring collective solutions” (Scharpf, 1999: 
11). Output legitimacy thus refers to the effectiveness of regulations: the fact that rules will 
effectively solve particular problems (Scharpf, 1997, 1999). It represents governance for the 
people, and focuses on the outcomes of regulations (i.e. how these rules are applied) (Easton, 
1957; Kitschelt, 1986). 
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Zürn (2004) emphasized that, in principle, private regulatory initiatives are confronted 
with the same legitimacy demands as governmental regulation. However, the democratic 
legitimacy of private governance mechanisms, such as MSIs, is much more complex (Risse, 
2004) because it connects to various publics that are geographically dispersed and do not 
form one institutionalized political container. The input legitimacy of MSIs is often contested 
because these initiatives involve private firms, which, for some scholars, must not be involved 
in regulatory activities (Cerny, 1999). MSI output legitimacy has also been criticized because 
the monitoring (the verification procedures over compliance) of global standards sometimes 
fails (Kirton & Trebilcock, 2004; Utting, 2002). Overall, MSI regulation is often criticized as 
mere window-dressing (Cerny, 1999; Kingsbury, 1999; Laufer, 2003). 
Despite this critique, more and more MSIs are being created (Bäckstrand, 2006; 
Bernstein & Cashore, 2007; Börzel & Risse, 2005; Bouslah, M'Zali, Turcotte, & Kooli, 
2010). It has been argued that MSIs are of increasing relevance with regard to the regulation 
of global value chains’ negative social and environmental side-effects (Christmann & Taylor, 
2006; Fung, 2003; Glasbergen, 2011; Hassel, 2008). As a result, self-regulation moves center 
stage in the overall debate on corporate responsibility (see e.g. Dahan, Doh, & Guay, 2006; 
Fransen & Kolk, 2007; Gilbert & Rasche, 2008; Scherer & Palazzo, 2011; Teegen, Doh, & 
Vachani, 2004; Vogel, 2010; Waddock, 2008), connecting the latter to the debate on global 
governance in political science (Held & McGrew, 2002; Koenig-Archibugi, 2004; Risse, 
2004) and political philosophy (Habermas, 2001; Young, 2006). However, despite the 
growing relevance of self-regulation, its legitimacy has hardly been studied comprehensively. 
Extant researches on MSI legitimacy are often focused on selected aspects, such as Risse’s 
(2004) study on MSI input legitimacy (for other studies on MSI legitimacy, see e.g. 
Bäckstrand, 2006; Beisheim & Dingwerth, 2008; Lövbrand, Rindefjäll, & Nordqvist, 2009; 
Schäferhoff, Campe, & Kaan, 2009). To our knowledge, no research has looked at a 
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comprehensive conceptual framework, identifying MSI democratic legitimacy criteria based 
on democratic theory. How can legitimacy demands developed for national democratic 
regimes be interpreted and translated for a global context of private regulatory schemes? MSI 
democratic legitimacy criteria cannot be directly derived from democratic theory, because the 
latter has the nation-state as a reference point. Instead, in the present study, we examine how 
criteria developed for the evaluation of governments in the nation-state context can be 
translated into the debate on global governance. We contribute to the scholarly debate on CSR 
and private regulation by developing a set of criteria inspired by democratic theory to 
evaluate the (input and output) legitimacy of MSIs. 
We begin by anchoring our analysis in democratic theory in Section 2, where we 
introduce the three dominant theories of democracy and how the idea of input and output 
legitimacy is derived from that debate. In Section 3, we examine the emerging global 
landscape of private regulation. Section 4 elaborates on the characteristics of MSIs as a key 
actor in this field. In Sections 4 and 5, we propose input and output legitimacy criteria, 
respectively. Finally, we discuss our results in Section 6 and apply our framework to the 
example of self-regulation in forest management. We conclude in Section 7 by discussing the 
research and policy implications of our framework. 
BETWEEN REPRESENTATION AND DELIBERATION 
Democratic legitimacy can be examined along the input and output dimensions of the 
political decision-making process (Easton, 1957; Scharpf, 1999). Political philosophers have 
developed three basic understandings of the democratic process with a varying interest in 
either output or input criteria of legitimacy: liberal, republican, and deliberative. These 
models of democracy are ideal types. Real-world democracies are always hybrids that mix 
elements of these concepts with a varying focus. Existing democracies, therefore, are inspired 
by such models, and these ideal types give a framework for understanding real-world 
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democratic processes and for evaluating them normatively. We briefly outline these three 
models in the subsequent paragraphs. These models, however, have been elaborated 
elsewhere. Here, we intend only to give an overview of these models and justify our use of 
deliberative democracy as a framework for understanding MSI democratic legitimacy. 
The liberal view sees politics as a formalized activity of governments, and as national 
legislative, executive, and judicial organs. The participation of citizens in politics is limited to 
a system of elections and representation (Elster, 1986). Democratic rights in the liberal sense 
are negative rights: Citizens have private interests and should be enabled to pursue their 
interests without too much state interference. As Habermas (1998: 241) argued: “By means of 
elections, the composition of parliamentary bodies, and the formation of a government, these 
interests are finally aggregated into a political will that can affect the administration.” 
Accordingly, the liberal conception of democracy focuses on the outcomes of a decision and 
operates with a rather thin idea of input legitimacy (Habermas, 1998). The latter is tested 
against two main assumptions: the political actors who govern have been elected in a 
democratic process and the decisions of governments are linked to debates in the parliament, 
where representatives of voters from potentially opposing camps can raise their voices and 
represent the interests and concerns of citizens (Habermas, 1998). As Risse argued, in 
democratic nation-states, governmental legitimacy is ensured because “the rulers are 
accountable to their citizens who can participate in rule-making through representation and 
can punish the rulers by voting them out of office” (Risse, 2006: 185). 
In contrast, the republican approach is input-focused. It understands politics as an 
important activity of the citizens themselves. Their participation in public will-formation 
represents a fundamental positive right. Republican philosophers have criticized the idea of 
the unbounded and atomized individual of liberal theory (Sandel, 1982; Taylor, 1989) and 
underlined the relevance of shared political practices for the solidarity of citizens and the 
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stability of democracy (Barber, 1984; Bellah, Madsen, Sullivan, Swidler, & Tipton, 1986). 
The role of the government is to organize processes of public will-formation, in which 
citizens can practice political participation and come to decisions for the common good. Here, 
the legitimacy of laws is strongly tied “to the democratic procedure by which they are 
generated” (Habermas, 1998: 242). 
Given the high complexity of modern political systems, Habermas (1998) criticized 
the republican idea of a direct and permanent participation of all citizens in politics as 
unrealistic. In his deliberative concept of democracy, he proposed to understand participation 
in political deliberation not as a civic duty, but as a right, which citizens might or might not 
use through their engagement in civil society organizations. The role of the government is to 
provide and promote arenas and processes of public deliberation in which civil society 
organizations can interact. These organizations bundle, amplify, and transmit the interests, 
values, and problems of the citizens. Ideally, their arguments resonate in public debates, and 
legitimate governmental decisions are those that connect to these public debates (Habermas, 
1996). The deliberative interpretation of the democratic process is participatory, but less 
demanding than the republican view while protecting the liberal idea of privacy and 
representation. It aligns input and output in one model of democratic legitimacy. 
All three ideal types of democracy share the idea of a (national) government as the 
ultimate point of reference for regulatory decisions: Laws are made by national governmental 
organs, supposed to represent citizens. However, the process of globalization has led to a 
situation in which the regulatory power of governments is challenged. Democratic legitimacy 
has to be innovated and translated into this new political constellation. Our framework is 
inspired by deliberative democratic thinking and we adapt its core principles to evaluate the 
legitimacy of MSIs. As we will argue, the deliberative idea of democratic legitimacy seems to 
be the most appropriate for the understanding of globalizing governance processes. 
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GOVERNANCE SHIFTS 
From National to Global Governance 
The three above-mentioned models of democracy apply to nation-state governance. In 
the 20th century, governance regimes have, however, shifted from a domestic to a global logic 
(Koenig-Archibugi, 2004; Scholte, 2005). These shifts manifest, for instance, in the 
increasing importance of soft law, and are, to some extent, reflected in the rise of MSIs as 
regulatory actors (Ruggie, 2007). Global governance refers to regulatory activities at a global 
(as opposed to national) level, in which no single government can act as ultimate enforcer of 
regulations. It describes “the structures and processes of governing beyond the state where 
there exists no supreme or singular political authority” (Held & McGrew, 2002: 8). In a 
globalizing world, these regulatory structures and processes are witnessing a fundamental 
transformation (Habermas, 1998; Scholte, 2005). The increasing mobility and flow of people, 
goods, and services is rendering borders less relevant, with nation-states increasingly 
interconnected politically, socially, and economically (Habermas, 1998; Henderson, Dicken, 
Hess, Coe, & Yeung, 2002), and is causing a denationalization of various political issues 
(Zürn, 2004). 
The rise of the TNC on the global playing field and related global business activities, 
which increase the complexity of production, have, among others, fuelled social and 
environmental negative side-effects (Buckley & Ghauri, 2004). Supply chains develop their 
own expansive dynamics: Suppliers buy from or outsource to other suppliers and can be 
connected to multiple TNCs (Young, 2006). Indeed, world production is now depicted as a 
global network, in which various actors are all linked across various supply chain layers 
(Hassel, 2008; Henderson et al., 2002; Levy, 2008) that “entail the disaggregation and 
dispersion of economic activities to multiple locations” (Levy, 2008: 944). Globally 
networked economic activities create globally networked social, political, environmental, and 
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economic problems that, in turn, require globalized regulatory mechanisms. The Westphalian 
system, where national governments have supreme authority over their territories, is now 
partly eroding (Mathews, 1997; Scherer et al., 2006; Scholte, 2005). The mechanisms of 
global regulation, still linked to the traditional understanding of governmental governance, are 
not always effective. In particular, the regulation of globally expanded corporate activities 
remains a challenge (Christmann & Taylor, 2006; Haufler, 2003a; Sethi, 2003). National 
regulatory schemes have failed, for example, to tackle environmental externalities of global 
markets (Christmann & Taylor, 2001), to ensure that TNCs do not violate human rights in 
failed states, such as Burma or Sudan (Spar & La Mure, 2003), or to tackle corruption in 
weak governance states (Misangyi, Weaver, & Elms, 2008). 
In the past, corporations were understood as objects of regulation, not as regulators. 
While this is true in the national context of governmental regulation, it was also the case in 
earlier processes of international regulation. The United Nations, for instance, traditionally 
had a quite hostile relationship with TNCs (Thérien & Pouliot, 2006). This changed when 
Kofi Annan proposed the Global Compact at the World Economic Forum in 1999, inviting 
corporations to become partners in the definition and implementation of CSR principles 
(Fritsch, 2008). The Global Compact illustrates the increasing engagement of TNCs in CSR 
activities to deal with the negative externalities that they create by acting at a global level 
(Spar & La Mure, 2003). Some TNCs self-regulate their behavior by creating and enforcing 
codes of conduct for their own operations, and sometimes also for their suppliers’ (Arya & 
Salk, 2006; Sethi, 2003; van Tulder & Kolk, 2001), they set environmental management 
systems that go beyond state requirements (Christmann & Taylor, 2001), they help to 
alleviate corruption (Kwok & Tadesse, 2006; Luo, 2006), and they increasingly communicate 
on such CSR activities, as well as on the values that underlie their engagement in such 
activities (Hess, 2007; Maignan & Ralston, 2002). TNCs deal with issues such as working 
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conditions, child labor, health and safety measures for workers and consumers, carbon 
footprints, and numerous other issues (Scherer & Palazzo, 2011). Increasingly, TNCs imitate 
their peers in adopting such CSR strategies (Hiss, 2009; Husted & Allen, 2006), and once 
adopted, constantly adapt to changing societal demands (Kolk & Pinkse, 2008). Peer-pressure 
thus leads to isomorphism in CSR behavior and taken-for-granted norms of behavioral 
standards (Vogel, 2010; Waddock, 2008). While some TNCs develop their own approaches to 
emerging regulatory challenges and societal demands, others have started to engage in MSI 
(Christmann & Taylor, 2006; Kobrin, 2009; Pies, Hielscher, & Beckmann, 2009). 
Soft Law Regulation 
As mentioned previously, MSIs partly build on a soft law approach (Kerwer, 2005), 
and consequently produce rules under the form of standards, as opposed to traditional hard 
law, namely laws written in codes and constitutions (Abbott & Snidal, 2000; Gilbert & 
Rasche, 2008). The argument here is not that traditional national regulation is disappearing. 
On the contrary, it is expanding (Zürn, 2004). However, national laws have, as we argued, 
only a limited influence on the social and environmental externalities produced in globally 
stretched production processes. New forms of regulation, such as soft law standards, are 
stepping in (Kerwer, 2005). For example, the certification of sustainable forest management is 
highly regulated by private regulatory standards: The certification of forests worldwide went 
from 0 ha in 1993 to 124 million ha in 2002 (Rametsteiner & Simula, 2003) to 323 million ha 
in 2008 (Cubbage & Moore, 2008), and there are more than 50 co-existing forest certification 
schemes (Domask, 2003; Schepers, 2010). Forestry is not the only example of this 
standardization trend. Similar schemes of private regulation can be found in various other 
industries, such as the apparel and mining industries. 
Soft law is characterized by the fact that it does not create legally binding obligations, 
but rather “derives its normative force through recognition of social expectations” (Ruggie, 
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2007: 14). It relies on voluntary compliance, rather than on sanctions that can be 
authoritatively and legally applied, as is the case in traditional governance (Gilbert & Rasche, 
2008). While a firm’s decision to engage in a soft law initiative is voluntary, once it commits 
to a specific standard, it is expected to comply (Waddock, 2008). If it does not comply, the 
company is not granted any type of certification or approval, and is often publicly exposed as 
a non-compliant actor (Vogel, 2010). In this sense, a standard is either enforced or the 
corporation drops out of the initiative. The enforcement of voluntary rules is often monitored 
by independent organizations (Cassel, 2001; Christmann & Taylor, 2006), such as NGOs, or 
by audit companies, such as PriceWaterhouseCoopers (PWC) (Gereffi, Garcia-Johnson, & 
Sasser, 2001). The assumption that the legitimacy of soft law standards depends on the 
democratic control of third-parties and the ability of the MSI to impose formal or informal 
sanctions seems to be widely shared (O'Rourke, 2003). NGOs acting as third-party control 
entities can decide to use “positive incentives and negative sanctions to entice actors into 
compliance with norms and rules” (Risse, 2006: 184). 
As these initiatives do not unfold under the shadow of national democratic processes, 
they operate in a space with several democratic shortcomings (Hassel, 2008). The 
Habermasian idea of translating political participation into the interaction between multitude 
of civil society organizations has been picked up in the debate on global governance as a 
possible model for the examination of democratic legitimacy beyond the nation-state (Gilbert 
& Rasche, 2007; Palazzo & Scherer, 2006; Scherer & Palazzo, 2007), and MSIs might 
represent one promising manifestation of that idea. 
MULTI-STAKEHOLDER INITIATIVES 
Governance with and without governments has been discussed under a wide range of 
names, such as MSIs (Koenig-Archibugi, 2004; O'Rourke, 2006; Utting, 2002), non-state 
market-driven governance (Cashore, 2002), international certifiable standards (Christmann & 
12 
Taylor, 2006), global public policy networks (Witte, Benner, & Streck, 2005), transnational 
private regulation (Bartley, 2007, 2010; Graz & Nölke, 2008), global action networks 
(Waddell, 2003), or public-private partnerships (Börzel & Risse, 2005). This scholarly debate 
refers to the mushrooming of those private regulatory initiatives in the last decade for which 
we use MSI as the umbrella term. Well-known examples of MSIs include the Forest 
Stewardship Council (FSC), one of the leading schemes in sustainable forest management; the 
Fair Labor Association (FLA), which tries to impose fair labor conditions throughout the 
world; and the Global Reporting Initiative (GRI), which establishes reporting guidelines for 
corporate sustainability reports. Other examples can be found in several issues, such as 
sustainable fishing, the mining industry, fair trade, finance, and human rights. Table 1 gives 
an overview of the existing MSIs, indicating their field, date of creation, rule-targets, as well 
as the stakeholders who are active in their regulatory processes. 
--------------------------------- 
Insert Table 1 about here 
--------------------------------- 
Although these initiatives and labels differ, their definitions converge on at least one 
criterion: They result from the cooperation of at least two of the three following actors: 
Governments, corporations, and civil society (generally represented by NGOs and 
humanitarian organizations). While all MSIs are established with regard to regulatory 
challenges, not all are rule-setting initiatives. Four levels of increasing engagement have been 
differentiated (Palazzo & Scherer, 2010): (1) MSIs provide learning platforms where 
organizations can exchange experiences, signal their commitment, and learn from each other. 
The UN Global Compact is an example of such a learning platform. (2) MSIs develop 
behavioral standards, in the form of codes of conduct, rules, recommendations, or guidelines, 
regarding rule-targets’ behavior and consequent activities. Rule-targets are expected to 
enforce and respect such rules. (3) MSIs develop mechanisms of auditing and compliance of 
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the rules. Such mechanisms can be more or less independent, and involve accreditation of 
third-party organizations with regard to the monitoring of the rules. (4) Finally, MSIs can 
issue labels and certifications for those organizations that comply with its standards. 
While initiatives such as the UN Global Compact and the CSR guidance principles of 
ISO26000 are also challenged with regard to their legitimacy, they are not in the focus of our 
analysis. Only when they attempt to create rules do MSIs take on a state-like function, as they 
issue regulations replacing or adding to the existing public rules. Moreover, our legitimacy 
analysis can only be applied to such MSIs, as democratic legitimacy is concerned with the 
capacity and authority of a regulatory body to issue and enforce rules. Accordingly, we have 
focused on initiatives that take a state-like function at a global level, and are therefore at least 
considered as being at the second of the above-listed four levels. 
As corporations participate in the establishment and commit to the voluntary 
implementation of MSI standards (Kerwer, 2005), the role of MSIs has been criticized (see 
e.g. Cerny, 1999; Graz & Nölke, 2008), but also acclaimed (see e.g. Bäckstrand, 2006; Ronit 
& Schneider, 1999). Most authors agree that MSIs are still not fully developed and need 
further refinement to be seen as legitimate mechanisms setting global rules (Beisheim & 
Dingwerth, 2008; Bernstein & Cashore, 2007; Black, 2008; Börzel & Risse, 2005). The 
legitimacy criteria for MSIs, which we have proposed, are inspired by the Habermasian idea 
of deliberative democracy, which tries to align input and output criteria. 
MSIs need to be perceived as legitimate from the input perspective in two different 
contexts (Risse, 2006). First, those governed by the initiative are the corporations abiding by 
the MSI’s rules: internal accountability refers to the fact that the participating firms must 
accept the MSI as having a rightful authority over them (Nanz, 2006). Second, external 
accountability must ensure that stakeholders who are not a part of the MSI’s processes, such 
as activist NGOs, governments, and consumers targeted by labels and certifications, will also 
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grant the MSI legitimacy on the basis of how they perceive the initiative as having a right to 
regulate (Bernstein & Cashore, 2007; Black, 2008). This implies that input legitimacy is 
influenced by (a) stakeholder inclusion; (b) procedural fairness of deliberations; (c) 
promotion of a consensual orientation, and (d) transparency of an MSI’s structures and 
processes. 
Output legitimacy relates to the capacity of governance mechanisms to effectively 
take a regulatory role (Nanz, 2006; Risse, 2006). One challenge is to overcome the non-
binding character of standards (Vogel, 2007), which creates free-rider issues, as less-visible 
and less-criticized corporations can take advantage of not participating in MSI regulations 
(Graz & Nölke, 2008). MSIs, however, can create “a more level-playing field,” by triggering 
isomorphic behavior across industries (Vogel, 2010: 78). Accordingly, to enhance output 
legitimacy, MSIs thus have to ensure high (a) coverage and (b) efficacy, as well as (c) 
guarantee a good enforcement and monitoring of their rules. 
As our paper aims at opening a debate for the evaluation of the legitimacy of global 
regulatory schemes, the criteria that we have proposed might not be the only ones, and future 
research might complete them with further insights. However, as we will show, the debate on 
global regulation already revolves around those criteria, which are summarized in Table 2. 
Moreover, as shown in Table 3, MSI generally publish these criteria on their websites to 
justify and legitimate their actions and governance principles. The criteria we have identified 
are inspired by and reflect, in varying degrees, core principles associated with deliberative 
democracy. We next define the four criteria of input legitimacy and the three criteria of output 
legitimacy and discuss how they stem from deliberative democracy. 
--------------------------------- 
Insert Table 2 about here 
--------------------------------- 
-------------------------------- 
Insert Table 3 about here 
15 
-------------------------------- 
MSI INPUT LEGITIMACY 
Inclusion 
Representative inclusion of stakeholders in political processes is necessary to enhance 
the legitimacy of rules (see e.g. Habermas, 1998; Risse, 2004; Scharpf, 1999; Young, 2000). 
Indeed, legitimate decision-making processes over rules include “all those who will be 
affected by them” (Young, 2000: 11). In the context of the (democratic) nation-state, 
inclusion is guaranteed either by procedures of direct democratic decision-making or by the 
election of representatives by citizens, who will then defend citizens’ interests in political 
decisions (Habermas, 1998). 
In MSIs, democratic representation and election are not possible. Rather, inclusion is 
defined as the involvement of stakeholders affected by the issue, where affected means “that 
decisions and policies significantly condition a person’s options for action” (Young, 2000: 
23). As for any democratic polity, the way in which an MSI includes different stakeholders is 
important to its input legitimacy (Black, 2008), as “even if they disagree with an outcome, 
political actors must accept the legitimacy of a decision if it was arrived at through an 
inclusive process of public discussion” (Young, 2000: 52). This means that even if an MSI 
includes a large number of stakeholders, its legitimacy might be low, because it does not 
involve the relevant ones. For example, the EU Water Initiative, in efforts to provide water in 
Sub-Saharan Africa, involves European actors, but insufficiently involves African actors, 
especially countries most touched by water deprivation (Water Aid & Tearfund, 2005). 
However, struggles over which stakeholders are affected will certainly be raised. For instance, 
the FSC is criticized by NGOs for insufficiently including indigenous communities living in 
the forests. This criticism is put forward by activist NGOs, such as The Rainforest Foundation 
or the FSC-Watch. Moreover, the forest certification field in general is criticized for ignoring 
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developing countries’ interests, as certified forests and companies come mainly from 
developed countries (Pattberg, 2005; Rametsteiner & Simula, 2003; Ronit & Schneider, 
1999). Another example of such criticism is found in the fight against money laundering. The 
Wolfsberg Process, a privately-led MSI, involving banks, as well as a few NGOs and 
academic representatives, has been much more criticized than its more inclusive competitors, 
such as Partnering Against Corruption Initiative (Pieth, 2007). 
Procedural Fairness 
The legitimacy of a democratic decision-making process depends on how the included 
stakeholders are able to influence this process (Young, 2000). Thus, legitimate rules are those 
that allow the affected stakeholders to have a voice in the deliberations that led to them. On 
the other hand, inclusion refers to stakeholder involvement in the activities, structures, and 
processes of MSIs, and the fairness of deliberations relates to the right that these stakeholders 
have been given to influence the decisions made. In other words, stakeholders could have 
been included in the MSI, but marginalized in the decision-making process. As such, the 
procedural quality of deliberations is a key element of legitimate political processes 
(Habermas, 1998; Risse, 2004; Young, 2000). 
To be fair, deliberations must be structured in such a way that power relations between 
stakeholders are neutralized. For example, the FLA and the Ethical Trading Initiative (ETI) 
include an even number of representatives on their respective Board of Directors from three 
different kinds of stakeholders: Academics, corporations and NGOs for the FLA and trade 
unions, as well as NGOs and corporations for the ETI. In contrast, the Kimberley Process 
involves corporations and civil society organizations in its processes, but only in consultation 
rounds. They thus have no voice in decision-making. Here (often non-democratic or even 
repressive), governments take decisions upon rules alone. MSIs are expected to build their 
decision-making processes in a way that power differences between the various actors 
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involved are neutralized, which is generally expected from a deliberative democratic point of 
view (Habermas, 1998). For example, TNCs may abuse a multi-stakeholder forum by 
advocating standards that might be too costly for small firms, thus creating an entry barrier 
into the MSI for (smaller) competitors (Raines, 2003; Witte et al., 2005). 
Consensual Orientation 
Deliberative democracy, as a philosophical concept, is inspired by the Habermasian 
idea of an ideal discourse, which should guide participants through the unforced “force of the 
better argument” toward a consensus (Habermas, 1990: 185). Such a consensus is important, 
because it signals the ability and willingness of the involved actors to change their position on 
the basis of convincing reasons. If participants are willing to potentially change their position, 
they would show that they are motivated to cooperate for the common ground. Consensual 
decisions, therefore, are considered to be more reasonable (i.e. reason-based) and more 
legitimate (Young, 2000). However, it has been argued that in real political discourses, 
democrats “act in a wide range of suboptimal circumstances” (Fung, 2005: 400; see also 
Scherer & Palazzo, 2007) that make a consensus highly unlikely. MSIs operate in a 
normatively fragmented landscape, bringing together a multitude of actors from various 
cultural and ideological backgrounds and with conflicting moral, economic, and political 
objectives. A standard-setting initiative might not achieve consensual solutions for most of 
the challenges it is dealing with. Under the condition of modern pluralism, a dissensus is 
much more probable than a consensus. Therefore, it might be more important to examine the 
conditions under which a disagreement might be described as reasonable (Gutmann & 
Thompson, 1996; Moon, 2003). It is neither realistic nor desirable for the corporations and 
NGOs participating in an MSI to collaborate without any consideration of their particular 
interests. However, an MSI can operate with a public-spirited culture of cooperation despite 
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dissenting positions, or it can operate as an institutionalized forum for bargaining and 
negotiating irreconcilable particular interests. 
Transparency 
Transparency demands for governments, corporations, and international institutions 
are continuously increasing (Florini, 1998). For example, the World Trade Organization 
struggled with regard to NGO criticism toward its total lack of transparency, which it then 
improved (Nanz & Steffek, 2004). In the context of global governance, “an institution is 
transparent if it makes its behavior and motives readily knowable to interested parties” (Hale, 
2008: 75). Also, the transparency of political non-state actors is crucial to their legitimacy 
(Elms & Phillips, 2009; Nanz & Steffek, 2004). The more transparent they are, the more 
external stakeholders will be able to evaluate the activities of the MSI (Hale, 2008), and more 
stakeholders can assess whether their preferences are respected (Scharpf, 1999). 
The transparency of the political process of rule-setting is an important criterion to 
evaluate the legitimacy of this rule, according to deliberative democrats. If a political process 
is more transparent, then more citizens can judge whether their preferences have been 
respected (Young, 2000). Transparency is thus also crucial to the legitimacy of MSIs because 
if a political process is more transparent, then stakeholders will obtain more information on 
this process (Black, 2008; O'Rourke, 2006; Witte et al., 2005). If decision-making processes, 
such as the elaboration of a standard, the voting procedures, or the repartition of power, are 
disclosed, legitimacy will be higher, as people can assess how a rule was decided upon and 
judge its appropriateness (Bernstein & Cashore, 2007; Risse, 2004). 
MSI OUTPUT LEGITIMACY 
Coverage 
Coverage measures the number of corporate actors bound by an MSI rule, and, as 
such, is directed toward the quantity of actors involved in standard implementation. 
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Effectiveness must ensure that the rules bind as many actors as possible, as long as these 
actors are concerned with the regulated issue (Beisheim & Dingwerth, 2008). Coverage drives 
output legitimacy, because the more the firms are bound by the rules, the more it will attract 
other companies that will perceive non-participation as a competitive disadvantage (Husted & 
Allen, 2006; Waddell & Khagram, 2007). As such, in the first phase, firms follow a utilitarian 
logic and “must perceive the costs of MSI governance to be less than current or potential 
economic benefits” (Bernstein & Cashore, 2007: 356). The challenge is thus to extend 
coverage to non-complying firms (Marx, 2008). While deliberative democracy in the nation-
state implies a national coverage, under which few trespassers can free-ride and avoid 
sanctions, MSI regulation suffers from much more problems in these regards. 
MSIs must attain a critical level in coverage to attract other companies and not be 
perceived as a competitive disadvantage (Bernstein & Cashore, 2007; Waddell & Khagram, 
2007). However, MSIs can benefit from cascading effects of coverage: The more buying 
firms of a supplier participate in an MSI, the more this supplier will be asked to engage and 
comply with the same standards (Clausen, Ankele, & Petschow, 2005). Having highly visible 
participating TNCs will increase coverage: Their suppliers and competitors will be more 
likely to engage (Vogel, 2010). The more the corporations from an industry are involved in an 
MSI, the more likely their competitors will engage so that others will not have a competitive 
advantage (Bernstein & Cashore, 2007; Husted & Allen, 2006). MSI coverage thus depends 
partly on first-movers with certain structural or cultural characteristics to attract competitors 
with the same characteristics. For example, if a small and medium enterprise (SME) engages 
in an MSI, competing SMEs are more likely to engage in turn, as opposed to competing 
TNCs. 
Efficacy 
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We define rule efficacy as the extent to which the rules fit the problem at hand, and 
are relevant for solving it effectively (Rucht, 2005). A standard might not provide an 
efficacious solution for the problem(s) at hand, either because it does not require enough 
corporate efforts (its level of requirement is too low or does not correspond to the rule-targets) 
(Raines, 2003; Sethi, 2003), or because even if it addresses the problem correctly, it creates 
additional negative externalities (Dupuy, 1991). According to deliberative democrats, a 
political institution has to define rules that follow citizens’ will and are translated into 
enforceable laws (Habermas, 1996). The extent to which rules correspond to citizens’ will, in 
general, will define its efficacy. 
Soft law regulation has been heavily criticized as a blue- or green-washing tool for 
corporations (Spar & La Mure, 2003), because it “addresses the ‘low hanging fruit’, i.e. the 
easiest and least costly changes to behavior” (Haufler, 2003b: 244). Some NGOs, for 
instance, have criticized SA8000, a standard regulating labor conditions, for not bringing real 
change to factories (see e.g. Labour Rights in China, 1999). 
While the standards might be inefficacious with regard to the problem at hand, they 
can also be inefficacious with regard to the rule-targets. For instance, as Vogel noted, 
standards are mainly elaborated for developed Western brands. Small firms and producers 
from developing countries might have difficulties in following these standards due to the high 
costs involved. Indeed, a negative externality of Western standards is that “many firms in 
developing countries have developed an adversarial relationship with private inspectors 
responsible for certifying their compliance with civil regulations and often seek to deceive 
them” ” (Vogel, 2010: 81). Therefore, several categories of participating firms might have 
different processes and need accordingly adapted standards (Raines, 2003). The FLA, for 
example, divides its participating firms into categories, each of which is required to abide by 
the same code of conduct, but using different implementation guidelines and a different tool. 
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Enforcement 
Enforcement, understood as the ability of an MSI to ensure that the rules that they 
establish are followed and applied in practice (Fransen & Kolk, 2007), plays a key role in the 
evaluation of the output legitimacy of private regulation. The effectiveness of MSIs “depends 
on the capacities of the association to control and sanction non-compliance and on a 
functioning background control by the public and NGOs” (Clausen et al., 2005: 179). While 
Habermas (1996) emphasized the challenges of translating citizens’ decisions into applicable 
and enforceable laws in national democratic regimes, this core principle of deliberative 
democracy is even more stringent in MSI regulation. Global soft law regulation is difficult to 
enforce due to deterritorialization and the fact that executive and judicial organs such as 
nation-states do not exist at a global level (Marx, 2008). 
MSIs often develop highly sophisticated monitoring procedures to control for standard 
compliance. Monitoring is probably the most important organizational challenge for MSIs. It 
is expensive, and firms and suppliers that are monitored multiple times might become 
overcontrolled, creating monitoring fatigue. Moreover, monitoring practices vary according to 
industries and even companies, making it difficult to compare (Locke, Qin, & Brause, 2007). 
At least four types of monitoring can be differentiated: Self-monitoring refers to the 
fact that the companies that apply an MSI standard control their own compliance. However, 
this kind of monitoring signals low output legitimacy as firms have possibilities to cheat, 
report falsely on compliance, and compliance cannot be verified (Marx, 2008; O'Rourke, 
2006). Several other types of monitoring have been described (see e.g. Gereffi et al., 2001; 
Marx, 2008; O'Rourke, 2006; van Tulder & Kolk, 2001): First-party monitoring is done by 
the MSI itself or one of its parties; second-party monitoring is paid for and done by an 
external audit company (e.g. PWC); and third-party is done by independent (accredited or 
not) civil society or governmental organizations. External third-party monitoring is expected 
22 
to provide more compliance than the other forms of monitoring (Marx, 2008; O'Rourke, 
2006). Independence is the key to show that there is no cheating or window-dressing (as 
second-party monitoring is paid for, it provides less independence than third-party) (Fransen 
& Kolk, 2007; van Tulder & Kolk, 2001). Through third-party monitoring, the MSI tries to 
adhere to the idea of a separation of political powers, separating standard-setting and standard 
enforcement. 
SUSTAINABLE FOREST MANAGEMENT AS AN ILLUSTRATION 
One of the first domains in which MSI regulation emerged is sustainable forest 
management. Today, protection of the world’s forests is largely developed on soft law 
regulation. Extensive academic research has addressed this issue. In the following, we 
demonstrate how our input and output legitimacy criteria can be applied to this issue. 
In the wake of the UN Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED) in 
Rio de Janeiro in 1992, the goal of which was to “help governments rethink economic 
development and find ways to halt the destruction of irreplaceable natural resources and 
pollution of the planet” (United Nations, 1997), several MSIs were created. As governments 
were only able to issue vague recommendations, a parallel NGO forum, together with private 
firms, answered this governance gap by launching a global scheme for the sustainable 
management of forests: the FSC (Pattberg, 2005). As a reaction to the lack of governmental 
resolution, the FSC decided not to involve governments in its structure, as opposed to the 
Sustainable Forestry Initiative (SFI), an MSI founded after the 1992 UNCED by the 
American Forest & Paper Association. Both of the MSIs develop standards for sustainable 
forest management and accredit independent certification bodies that verify the 
implementation of the respective standards. Examination of the democratic legitimacy of 
these two self-regulatory schemes with our criteria led to the following results. 
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The highest decision-making body of the SFI is the Board of Directors composed of 
18 representatives from the social, economic, and environmental sectors. In the FSC, the 
highest decision-making organ is its General Assembly, composed of all FSC members. 
While the SFI has the advantage of including governmental representatives in its Board of 
Directors, the FSC has greater inclusion, as its decision-making body involves all its 
members. 
The interests of all FSC members are certainly greater than those represented by the 
SFI Board. Both the decision-making organs are governed by three chambers equally (in 
terms of vote) representing the social, economic, and environmental sectors, and their 
procedural fairness is rather high. The FSC has an additional restriction to power differences: 
Each of the three chambers is equally divided into North and South interests. However, as 
Dingwerth (2008) noted, the procedures and structures in place in the FSC for allowing 
different stakeholders a voice in decision-making processes do not always translate into 
effectively equal decisions. As such, the FSC’s procedural fairness might be assessed as more 
or less equal to that of the SFI. 
As the SFI was founded by the private sector only, it signals a lower consensual 
orientation than the FSC. Indeed, the industry-led SFI will be less ready to accept inputs from 
other stakeholders in the internal process of developing rules (Bouslah et al., 2010; Schepers, 
2010). “Since the firms supply compliance reports privately to the industry association” 
(Gereffi et al., 2001: 61), the transparency of the SFI is lower than that of the FSC, which 
publicly reports compliance. Moreover, the FSC also publishes the audit results of its 
certification bodies. The SFI has however been heavily criticized by NGOs, such as the 
Rainforest Action Network or Greenpeace, for its shortcomings in consensual orientation and 
transparency (Gereffi et al., 2001). As such, the SFI changed its structures and processes, and 
now nearly matches the FSC in these regards (Schepers, 2010). For example, since 2010, the 
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SFI standard includes a transparency principle, which states that the audit results of certified 
companies must be publicly disclosed. Overall, the input legitimacy of the FSC might be 
assessed as slightly higher than that of the SFI, but it is only after approximately 10 years of 
existence that the SFI matched the FSC. 
On the output side, as of the beginning of 2011, the coverage of the FSC is 131 
million ha of forests, whereas that of the SFI is only 72 million ha. Moreover, the SFI focuses 
mainly on the USA (certifying more forests and producers in the USA than the FSC), while 
the FSC attempts to be more global (Schepers, 2010). This would point to the fact that the 
FSC has to include more interests than the SFI. 
In terms of efficacy, it has been argued that the FSC induces more social change than 
the SFI, for example, by consulting more with communities and organizing more stakeholder 
meetings (Cubbage & Moore, 2008: 32). In the same vein, the FSC also brings more changes 
to the environmental aspect of forest management, whereas the SFI is more focused on 
economic and managerial improvements (Cubbage & Moore, 2008). According to Bouslah et 
al. (2010: 554), this is because the FSC is a performance-based standard focusing on the 
condition of the forest, whereas the SFI is a management-based standard focusing on 
management responsibilities and processes. The FSC standards are also better adapted to 
different forests and producers, with, for example, a dedicated program for forest 
smallholders. However, the SFI has only one umbrella standard. 
With regard to enforcement, the FSC has an elaborate accreditation system of 
independent NGOs. These certification bodies are then allowed to certify companies in the 
forest industry. The FSC also has a method for controlling each step of wood production (so-
called chain of custody), allowing certification of forests and wood end-products. However, 
the FSC has reached a critical size. It faces criticism from activists that monitoring is left to 
organizations that are not reliable and do not respect its principles (The Rainforest 
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Foundation, 2002). The SFI has also been criticized for its monitoring methods. During the 
beginning of its existence, the SFI relied on self-monitoring, but now, it also accredits 
independent certification bodies to control the implementation of its standard (Dingwerth, 
2008). However, third-party monitoring is still optional in the SFI (Bouslah et al., 2010). 
Accordingly, the output legitimacy of the SFI might be assessed as lower than that of the 
FSC, with the latter having a high output legitimacy. Table 4 details the input and output 
dimensions of legitimacy of the FSC and SFI. 
-------------------------------- 
Insert Table 4 about here 
-------------------------------- 
The FSC has grown to become one of the largest MSIs in the forestry sector 
(Visseren-Hamakers & Glasbergen, 2007), and although it has raised criticism, the FSC is 
generally considered as the most effective and credible scheme in this sector (Bartley, 2010; 
Dingwerth, 2008; Schepers, 2010). It not only certifies highly visible companies, such as 
IKEA and Home Depot, but also the whole wood supply chain, and is supported by NGOs 
such as the World Wildlife Fund (WWF). On the other hand, the SFI, although lagging 
behind the FSC in some aspects, is also considered as a credible and effective competitor, at 
least in the USA, whereas other initiatives, such as the African Timber Organization (ATO) 
or the national initiative of Indonesia, the Indonesian Ecolabelling Institute (LEI), have not 
reached this level of credibility and effectiveness (Bouslah et al., 2010; Rametsteiner & 
Simula, 2003). The ATO, for example, only includes governments in its standard-setting 
procedures, whereas LEI’s monitoring is not independent. 
This example further illustrates how our framework allows for an evaluation of the 
democratic legitimacy of MSIs along two benchmarks. First, we see our framework as a 
benchmark for competing initiatives in a certain field. However, it is hard to prioritize one 
criterion over another, and MSIs can be compared along each of these criteria and the 
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dimensions of democratic legitimacy, as we have shown in the above-mentioned example. 
We argue that our framework would allow for a comprehensive picture of the legitimacy of 
soft law in a field, if all MSIs were analyzed. Comparing the legitimacy of several MSIs 
would allow to better understand criticism toward certain MSIs by NGOs, as well as the areas 
of improvement for these initiatives. MSIs could also strive to enhance their relative 
performance on these criteria, as was done by the SFI. 
Second, MSIs can be benchmarked against the ideal of democratic legitimacy, because 
ideally, these self-regulatory initiatives should be high on input and output criteria of 
democratic legitimacy. This ideal should be understood as the normative point of reference 
toward which MSIs should develop. While the FSC, for instance, is considered highly 
legitimate both from an input and output point of view, it has nonetheless been criticized, and 
in reaction, it has tried to improve its structure and processes. We suggest a dynamic 
interpretation of MSI legitimacy, understanding it as a process of constant improvement. 
“Legitimacy cannot be considered an all-or-nothing proposition” (Scharpf, 1999: 26): An 
MSI cannot be democratically legitimate only by being highly legitimate from either an input 
or output side (Scharpf, 1999). Indeed, the input and output sides of political processes are 
closely interrelated and both influence how their democratic legitimacy would be perceived 
(Easton, 1957; Kitschelt, 1986; Scharpf, 1999). 
As the discussion between philosophers in the three theoretical camps of liberalism, 
republicanism, and deliberative democracy shows, the ideal criteria of the different 
approaches can collide. This is not only true for a government-based understanding of 
democracy, but applies as well to private regulation. For example, inclusion could have a 
negative effect on output legitimacy. By enhancing the diversity of stakeholders in an MSI’s 
processes (inclusion), it is probable that divergent views will arise in deliberations. As such, it 
will be more difficult to achieve mutual agreements and rules might be less efficacious, thus 
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reducing MSI effectiveness. For example, the FLA, in its preliminary discussions in the 1990s 
over its Code of Conduct, included corporations, NGOs, unions, and universities. However, 
these stakeholders did not come to a consensus on living wages and freedom of association in 
China, leading unions and some NGOs to leave the dialogue (Sethi, 2003). Another example 
of input and output legitimacy interplay relates to the impact of transparency on enforcement. 
Transparency enhances access of the public to corporate information and thus augments the 
chance that corporations will efficaciously enforce the standards (Clausen et al., 2005; Vogel, 
2010; Waddock, 2008). Indeed, “when codes do not reveal compliance mechanisms, the 
probability of compliance by companies and their business partners decreases, thus also 
lowering codes’ credibility” (van Tulder & Kolk, 2001: 276), which was the case of the SFI 
in the past (Gereffi et al., 2001). However, the interplay between democratic legitimacy, its 
dimensions, and criteria needs further research to adequately identify their relationships, 
directions, effects, and causes. 
IMPLICATIONS 
Research Implications 
Our framework allows for multiple avenues of future theoretical and empirical 
research. First, we believe that the criteria and their impact on MSI legitimacy can be 
measured and tested empirically. Table 5 complements Table 2 with details for 
operationalization of each criterion. 
--------------------------------- 
Insert Table 5 about here 
--------------------------------- 
The dependent variable, democratic legitimacy, could be measured by several 
reputation indices, such as Gardberg and Fombrun’s reputation quotient (2002), and Janis and 
Fadner’s coefficient of imbalance (1965), or its adaptation by Deephouse, the coefficient of 
media endorsement (1996). Further exploratory qualitative and quantitative studies would 
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also be needed to build propositions and hypotheses as to the aforementioned interplay 
between the criteria. It would be possible, for example, for the weights of the criteria to 
change according to the industry, area, and issue. Inclusion could be more important in highly 
fragmented industries with complex and long supply chains. In-depth case studies of MSIs 
would prove useful to examine in detail how these criteria unfold in existing MSIs, and to 
develop hypotheses. Exploratory quantitative analysis (post-hoc investigations) of the model 
and correlations between the criteria described earlier would also help in this regard. 
Our paper takes the MSI as the unit of analysis and does not consider legitimacy 
challenges at the level of individual actors who participate in the initiative. There is, for 
instance, a difference between the legitimacy of an MSI and that of its participants. Whether 
or not there is an impact of the legitimacy of the MSI on that of the participating corporations 
and NGOs, and whether or not there is a link between the participation in an MSI and the 
financial performance of a corporation, are relevant questions. The impact of free-riding and 
non-adherent firms on MSI legitimacy also needs to be examined. However, these aspects are 
beyond the scope of our paper, which intends to shed light on the condition of legitimacy in 
the emerging domain of private regulation. 
Finally, the paper also allows for several theoretical investigations, which could be 
addressed by conceptual and empirical analyses. For example, the conflict between profit and 
non-profit organizations within an MSI would need further investigation. Future research 
could also include quantitative and qualitative analyses on the salience of the criteria of input 
and output legitimacy in the existing MSIs, their dynamics, and evolution through the MSI 
lifetime. 
Policy Implications 
We also believe that our framework has multiple policy implications. First, we deem 
that the success of MSIs depends on their democratic legitimacy as private regulatory 
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initiatives at a transnational level, which is being highly credible and effective in taking a 
state-like function at a transnational level. We believe that our findings can be useful for the 
design of the structures and processes of the existing and future MSIs. We would advise MSI 
administrators to pay attention to issues such as the independence of monitoring or the 
inclusion of all the affected stakeholders. 
Second, corporations should also pay attention to the democratic legitimacy of the 
MSIs they engage in. By engaging in a legitimate MSI, they are likely to preempt some of the 
civil society’s attacks (Vogel, 2010). Indeed, by participating in MSIs, “companies also hope 
to reduce the demands they are facing from multiple stakeholders (particularly critical 
NGOs), customers (including corporate customers), and social investors, among others” 
(Waddock, 2008: 105). This would also mean that corporations should not try to manipulate 
the processes of standard-setting, and be ready to accept other stakeholders’ inputs, which 
would, in the end, enhance the legitimacy of the MSI in which they engage. As corporations 
increasingly take a political role in a globalizing world, engagement in legitimate MSIs will 
foster this role and certainly increase their legitimacy as a political actor (Scherer & Palazzo, 
2007, 2011). 
Third, the role of governments in transnational private regulation is also important. 
While our paper demonstrates the growing relevance of soft law regulation, we do not want to 
deny the superior regulatory power of hard law regulation by democratically elected 
governments. The challenge for governments is in finding ways of evaluating MSIs and 
connecting to them to better align their own national regulatory activities with those of private 
actors on the global playing field. Our framework also offers governments and 
intergovernmental agencies criteria to judge the legitimacy of MSIs prior to participating in 
them or promoting them. As soft law takes on increasing importance globally, governments 
might also consider how to collaborate and increase synergies with private regulatory bodies, 
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for example, in “recogniz[ing] the legitimacy of the most viable regulations by further 
incorporating them as participants in formal political decision-making processes” 
(Glasbergen, 2011: 22). Moreover, some governments have decided to embed soft law in their 
national hard law, such as Denmark and Sweden, for state-owned companies that are required 
to report according to GRI principles (CSR Europe, 2010). 
CONCLUSION 
There are a number of important further steps and challenges for transnational private 
regulation and the implementation of MSI legitimacy criteria. It will be important to find 
ways to embed such voluntary standards in democratic and government structures (Vogel, 
2010). In a globalizing world with increasingly expanding economic activities and related 
social and environmental externalities, MSIs could be a way to deal with these externalities in 
a democratic way (Scherer & Palazzo, 2008). As TNCs realize that they cannot ignore or 
solve these issues alone, they engage in MSIs. We believe that as the role of corporations in 
society is increasingly under watch by activists, NGOs, and the wider public, corporations can 
increase their commitment to responsible behavior by participating in democratically 
legitimate MSIs. As CSR increasingly involves the private regulation of business (Kobrin, 
2009; Matten & Crane, 2005; Scherer & Palazzo, 2011; Scherer et al., 2006; Waddock, 2008), 
the legitimacy of such regulation will be increasingly important, at least for as long as a 
global nexus of public governance is neither available, nor effective and credible. 
However, these new mechanisms face numerous input and output legitimacy 
problems. This paper has contributed to the debate on MSI regulation of TNC activities by 
highlighting the criteria and challenges in defining and evaluating the democratic legitimacy 
of private regulatory regimes. It has also contributed to the CSR literature by examining these 
new mechanisms, whereby corporate engagement signals an increasing political role. By 
outlining a framework for evaluating the legitimacy of MSIs, the paper has contributed to 
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research on private regulation and its role in a globalizing world, where governmental 
regulation is not always available. We argue that this role can only be successfully fulfilled if 
MSIs meet some basic requirements of credibility and effectiveness criteria. Specifically, this 
paper has described the democratic embeddedness of MSIs as the result of their input and 
output legitimacy. By building on insights from normative democratic theory, and translating 
it to the global level, this paper has identified criteria of both forms of legitimacy. While 
further research is needed, this paper has outlined avenues for MSIs to enhance their input 
legitimacy and effectiveness, so that sustainable regulations for governance in a global world 
can be worthwhile. 
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FOOTNOTES
                                                 
i
 Throughout the paper, when we speak about governments or nation-states, we include all 
national governmental organs of the state apparatus, i.e. judicial, executive, legislative organs. 
These organs are, in general, believed to represent citizens’ will in a democratic national 
regime, and translate this will into applicable laws. 
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TABLE 1 
An Overview of Different Multi-Stakeholder Initiatives 
Multi-stakeholder initiative Creation 
date 
Issue Rule-targets Stakeholders in governancea 
C
or
po
ra
tio
ns
 
G
ov
er
n
m
en
ts
b  
N
G
O
s 
Tr
a
de
 
u
n
io
ns
c  
A
ca
de
m
ia
 
Responsible Care 1985 Sustainability of the chemical industry Corporations  () () ()  
African Timber Organization 1993 Sustainable forest management Corporations ()     
Forest Stewardship Council 1993 Sustainable forest management Corporations      
Sustainable Forestry Initiative 1995 Sustainable forest management Corporations  () ()   
Canadian Standards 
Association 
1996 Sustainable forest management Corporations  ()    
Global Reporting Initiative 1997 Sustainable reporting Corporations  ()    
Social Accountability 1997 Labor conditions Corporations      
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International (SA8000) 
World Commission on Dams 1997 Dam building Corporations 
Governments 
     
Ethical Trading Initiative 1998 Fair trade Corporations      
AccountAbility (AA1000) 1999 Sustainability (stakeholder engagement, 
accountability, information) 
Corporations 
Governments 
NGOs 
     
Fair Labor Association 1999 Labor conditions Corporations      
Global Compact 1999 Global sustainability principles Corporations      
ISEAL Alliance 1999 Standardization schemes synergies MSIs      
Marine Stewardship Council 1999 Sustainable fishing Corporations      
Indonesian Ecolabelling 
Institute (LEI) 
2000 Sustainable forest management Corporations      
Voluntary Principles on 2000 Human rights Corporations      
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Security + Human Rights 
Wolfsberg Process 2000 Anti-money laundering Banks      
Worldwide Responsible 
Apparel Production Initiative 
2000 Labor conditions Corporations      
EU Water Initiative 2002 Water supply Governments ()  ()   
Extractive Industry 
Transparency Initiative 
2002 Transparency of money transfers between 
governments and corporations 
Governments      
IUCN-ICMM Mining 
Dialogue 
2002 Biodiversity in mining areas Corporations      
Kimberley Process 2002 Mining (diamond) Governments ()  ()   
Equator Principles 2003 Project financing Corporations  () ()   
Sustainable Coffee Partnership 2003 Sustainability in the coffee sector Corporations      
Partnering Against Corruption 
Initiative 
2004 Corruption Corporations      
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Roundtable on Sustainable 
Palm Oil 
2004 Sustainability of the palm oil supply chain Corporations      
Better Cotton Initiative 2005 Sustainability of the cotton supply chain Corporations      
4C Association 2006 Sustainability of the coffee supply chain Corporations      
Roundtable on Responsible 
Soy 
2006 Sustainability of the soy supply chain Corporations  ()   () 
Better Work 2007 Labor conditions Corporations      
Bonsucro Better Sugarcane 
Initiative 
2007 Sustainability of sugar cane production Corporations      
Water Footprint Network 2008 Sustainable use of water resources Corporations 
Governments 
     
GoodWeave 2009 Child labor Corporations      
World Banana Forum 2009 Sustainability of the banana supply chain Corporations      
Aquaculture Stewardship 2009 Responsible aquaculture Corporations      
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Council 
ISO 26000 2010 Social responsibility Corporations 
Governments 
     
Roundtable on Sustainable 
Bio-fuels 
2010 Sustainability of biofuels production and 
processing 
Corporations      
a
 ‘’ signifies that the stakeholder category is fully involved in governance processes of the MSI; ‘()’ signifies that the stakeholder category is 
only consulted or is not given enough power to influence decisions. 
b
 The ‘Governments’ category also includes international institutions. 
c
 Trade unions are sometimes included in civil society or NGOs. If trade unions are not specifically mentioned, they are not included for the 
purpose of the table. 
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TABLE 2 
Criteria of MSI Democratic Legitimacy 
Dimension Criterion Definition Key questions 
Input Inclusion Involvement of stakeholders affected by the 
issue in the structures and processes of the 
MSI 
Are the involved stakeholders representative for 
the issue at stake? Are important stakeholders 
excluded from the process? 
 Procedural fairness Neutralization of power differences in 
decision-making structures 
Does each of these categories of stakeholder have a 
valid voice in decision-making processes? 
 Consensual orientation Culture of cooperation and reasonable 
disagreement 
To what extent does the MSI promote mutual 
agreement among participants? 
 Transparency Transparency of structures, processes and 
results 
To what extent are decision-making and standard-
setting processes transparent? 
To what extent are the performance of the 
participating corporations and the evaluation of 
that performance transparent? 
Output Coverage Number of rule-targets following the rules How many rule-targets are complying with the 
52 
rules? 
 Efficacy Fit of the rules to the issue To what extent do the rules address the issue at 
hand? 
 Enforcement Practical implementation of the rules and 
their verification procedures 
Is compliance verified and non-compliance 
sanctioned? 
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TABLE 3 
Support for Criteria from Existing MSIs 
MSI Quote Illustrated criteria 
Sustainable Coffee 
Partnership 
“The Partnership will be guided by a few basic principles including: 
• Build upon and across existing initiatives and institutions—modify existing 
infra-structures before setting up new infra-structure 
• Place priority on concrete projects and collaborations  
• Promote coherence and shared understandings  
• Emphasize support for small producers and the most vulnerable actors in the 
coffee sector.  
• Draw upon public-private partnerships both at the project and policy levels 
wherever possible  
• Ensure transparent multi-stakeholder representation and decision making  
• Activities and policy should be developed on a global scale, but must consider 
regional and sectorial realities and dynamics.” - 
http://www.iisd.org/pdf/2004/sci_schematic_structure_draft.pdf 
Consensual orientation 
Procedural fairness 
Transparency 
Inclusion 
Efficacy 
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International Seafood 
Sustainability 
Foundation 
“Our coalition’s approach is deliberate and collaborative, which can require a bit 
of extra time but generally leads to the best result. Instead of one stakeholder 
making up some of the rules, all stakeholders make up all the rules.” - http://iss-
foundation.org/about-us/our-approach/frequently-asked-questions/ 
Procedural fairness 
Round Table on 
Responsible Soy 
“The Round Table on Responsible Soy (RTRS) is the global platform composed 
of the main soy value chain stakeholders with the common objective of 
promoting the responsible soy production through collaboration, dialogue and 
consensus finding among the involved sectors in order to foster a economical, 
social and environmental sustainability.” - http://www.responsiblesoy.org/ 
Consensual orientation 
Inclusion 
Roundtable on 
Sustainable Biofuels 
“The RSB has developed a third-party certification system for biofuels 
sustainability standards, encompassing environmental, social and economic 
principles and criteria through an open, transparent, and multi-stakeholder 
process. Participation in the RSB is open to any organization working in a field 
relevant to biofuels sustainability.” - http://rsb.epfl.ch/ 
Enforcement 
Efficacy 
Transparency 
Inclusion 
Aquaculture 
Stewardship Council 
“More than a standards holding body, the ASC will be a global transformation 
system for aquaculture, that will achieve: 
Inclusion 
Transparency 
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Credibility: the standards are developed according to ISEAL guidelines, multi-
stakeholder, open and transparent, science-based performance metrics. 
Effectiveness: minimising the environmental and social footprint of commercial 
aquaculture by addressing key impacts. 
Added value: connecting the farm to the marketplace by promoting responsible 
practices through a consumer label.” - 
http://www.ascworldwide.org/index.cfm?act=tekst.item&iid=2&lng=1 
Efficacy 
Enforcement 
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TABLE 4 
Comparison between the FSC and the SFIa 
Criterion FSC SFI 
Inclusion  General Assembly including all FSC members 
 Divided into three chambers: economic, social, 
environmental 
 Split into sub-chambers North and South 
 No governments included 
 Board of Directors of 18 representatives (two consecutive 
three year-term maximum)  
 Divided into three chambers: economic, social, 
environmental 
 Only body that can modify the standard 
Procedural 
fairness 
 Equal vote and power between chambers 
 Votes from North and South organizations equally weighted 
 Code of Good Practice for setting standards (ISEAL 
accreditation) 
 Public review process of standard-setting  
 Board decisions must be approved by at least 80% of those 
present, which must include at least two representatives 
from each sector 
Consensual 
orientation 
 NGO-initiated 
 Dispute Resolution System 
 Corporation-initiated initiative 
Transparency  Detailed standard-setting procedure, initiated by a motion of 
the General Assembly 
 Standard-setting includes public consultation. Developed 
by multi- stakeholder resources committee, approval by the 
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 Clear weighting of votes 
 Publication of audit results  
 Publication of accreditation results (of certification bodies) 
Board Reviewed by independent SFI External Review 
Panel. 
 Publication of audit results 
Coverage  131 mios ha  72 mios ha 
Efficacy  Forest management certification (program for smallholders) 
 Chain of custody certification 
 FSC controlled wood (end products) 
 Performance-based 
 Focus on environmental and social challenges 
 One global standard 
 Chain of custody certification 
 Fiber sourcing certification 
 Management-system based 
 Focus on economic and managerial challenges 
Enforcement  Third-party monitoring 
 Independent certification bodies 
 Accreditation by Accreditation Services International 
(control of certification bodies, in line with ISO) 
 First-, second-, and third-party monitoring (latter optional) 
 Independent certification bodies  
 Accreditation by American National Standards Institute, 
National Accreditation Board, and/or Standards Council of 
Canada 
a
 Sources: www.fsc.org; www.sfiprogram.org; Bartley, 2007, 2010; Bass & Simula, 1999; Bouslah et al., 2010; Cubbage & Moore, 2008; 
Dingwerth, 2008; Gereffi et al., 2001; Rametsteiner & Simula, 2003; Schepers, 2010; The Rainforest Foundation, 2002; Visseren-Hamakers & 
Glasbergen, 2007. 
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TABLE 5 
Criteria Operationalization 
Dimension Criterion Operationalization 
Input Inclusion  Number of different stakeholders represented in the highest decision-making body 
 Number of criticisms regarding exclusion of stakeholder category 
 Procedural fairness  Percentage of stakeholders having the right to vote in the highest decision-making body 
 Percentage of stakeholders having a veto right 
 Balance/weighting of votes 
 Consensual orientation  In minutes of Board meetings, working groups, and General Assemblies, how many times have 
stakeholders changed their mind following an argument raised by another stakeholder? 
 In these minutes, how many stakeholders show signs of cooperation (e.g. by disclosing confidential 
information)? 
 Transparency  Are decision-making processes in the Board/GA publicly disclosed (i.e. website)? 
 Is the elaboration of a rule clearly defined? 
 Are monitoring results publicly disclosed? 
Output Coverage  Percentage of firms per industry/region abiding to the rules 
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 Percentage of production covered 
 Efficacy  Does the level of requirement lie below/above other MSIs? 
 Does the level of requirement lie below the requirements formulated by independent experts? 
 Quantity and quality of negative side-effects created by the rules 
 Does the problem, targeted by the rule change/improve?  
 Enforcement  Which kind of monitoring is used by the MSI (none/1st/2nd/3rd party)? 
 Are external organizations certified to monitor/accredit rule-targets? 
 Is there a set of sanctions in case of non-compliance?  
 Has cheating been observed and does the MSI react to these incidents? 
 
